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Tony Blair’s landslide electoral victory on May 1 (New Labour Day?) presents the party in power with a 
rare, perhaps even unprecedented, opportunity to revitalise and modernise Britain’s ailing and antiquated 
manufacturing economy.*
 
  If it is to do so, it must remain true to its long-standing (indeed, historic) 
commitment to restore an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism.  In this paper we argue that this 
in turn requires that the party reject the very neo-liberal orthodoxies which it offered to the electorate as 
evidence of its competence, moderation and ‘modernisation’, which is has internalised, and which it 
apparently now views as circumscribing the parameters of the politically and economically possible.   
In this context, New Labour enjoys an almost unique advantage: a mandate for change, reflected in its 179 
seat overall majority, more fundamental than that it sought.  Yet such a situation does present certain 
difficulties for a party whose manifesto and supporting policy documents contained, at best, a submerged 
radicalism couched within the rhetoric of competence, consensus and conciliation.1  The position, then, is 
one of opportunity and threat.  Judged purely on the scale of defeat and the recriminatory ructions that 
currently engulf the Party, the Conservatives would appear consigned to the electoral margins for at least 
two terms.  This provides Labour with a rare (and much-needed) opportunity to think long-term.  Yet 
despite its best intentions, the situation is also that in which expectations of reform — and rapid reform at 
that — exceed both Labour’s declared ambition and, in all likelihood, the capacity of a more resolutely 
radical government (with a clearly reforming manifesto and a mandate) to deliver.  Moreover, despite the 
much-vaunted vibrancy of the British economy, difficult decisions face the newly incumbant 
administration.  In particular these concern: (i) Europe and the relative costs (economic and political) of 
membership or exclusion from a European Single Currency in 1999 or some time thereafter; (ii) the relative 
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wage-skill profile of the British labour market and hence the nature of the competitive position and mode of 
insertion of the national economy within European and global economic dynamics; and, perhaps more 
acutely still, (iii) Britain’s distinctive lack of manufacturing investment, the paucity of its capital stock, the 
obsolescence of much of its beleaguered manufacturing capacity, and its characteristic shortfall of 
‘dedicated’ capital.  The most long-standing and, we argue, ultimately the most fundamental of these 
concerns is the third.  Accordingly, this provides the principal focus of attention in this paper.  Indeed, our 
argument is that by restoring an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism, the terms by which we 
understand the insertion of the domestic economy within wider political and economic dynamics may be 
fundamentally recast.   
 
Our central contention in what is to follow is that if New Labour is to demonstrate the economic 
competence of its electoral convictions, it must first rediscover the political courage of its former policy 
convictions, challenging (and ultimately rejecting) the terms by which that competence has come to be 
understood.  Indeed, more broadly, it must transcend the pervasive neo-liberal paradigm that has come to 
circumscribe the parameters of what is considered politically and economically feasible, possible and 
desirable in Britain as elsewhere.  Though sacrificed or, on a more favourable reading, relegated to the 
Downsian electoral imperative that seemingly came to dominate the revision of policy in the pre-election 
period, traces of precisely such an alternative economic and political vision can still be identified in the 
Party’s (albeit diluted) proposals on industrial, regional and financial reform.  Originating in the Policy 
Review itself, they were associated in particular with the Shadow DTI under the tutelage of first Bryan 
Gould and, subsequently, Robin Cook.  Yet the contradictions evident between this more dirigiste 
conception of a supply-side ‘developmental state’ and the developing fiscal fortitude of the Shadow 
Treasury Team have clearly been resolved, for the time being, in favour of the latter.2  Our aim in this paper 
is to return to the former, to reclaim the potentially radical and, within the context of neo-liberal economics, 
heretical core of New Labour’s erstwhile industrial and regional strategy, and to review critically the 
political and economic alternatives available to New Labour once the shackles of the neo-liberal paradigm 
have been cast off.   
 
In what follows we concern ourselves with the problem (for problem it is) of productive investment.  We 
concentrate in particular on policy priorities for the expansion of manufacturing capacity and the 
rejuvenation of the productive economy through the restoration of an indigenous investment ethic to British 
capitalism.  Yet before considering the space for alternatives, it is first important to consider the broader 
diagnosis of the affliction to which such reforms must constitute a response, and the distinctiveness and 
intractability of this British condition.   
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Lacking dedication: The pathologies of British capitalism 
 
The argument that British capitalism is distinctive, exceptional even, has a long and distinguished pedigree 
amongst critics of the left for whom its characteristic pathologies can be traced to the peculiar dislocation 
of financial and industrial capital and the persistent ascendancy of the former.  It is associated in particular 
with the so-called ‘Anderson-Nairn theses’, published in a series of instalments in New Left Review from 
the early 1960s.3  In recent years the argument has received something of a revival, being dusted off and 
repackaged in the form of Will Hutton’s blistering polemic, The State We’re In, and its somewhat more 
conciliatory sequel, The State to Come.4  The argument is elegant in its simplicity.  Britain’s distinctive 
pathologies can be traced ultimately to the incomplete nature of its bourgeois revolution.  Lacking the 
creative destruction of a genuinely revolutionary upheaval, Britain’s precocious capitalism inherited much 
of its institutional architecture and cultural distinctiveness from the feudal era.  These peculiarities of 
primacy were to become what they remain today — fetters on continued economic development and capital 
accumulation.   
 
In the current context, these generic tendencies of British capitalism are reflected in a body of company law 
which discourages long-term strategic investment, a macroeconomic policy-making process that 
institutionalises the interests of financial over industrial capital, and a banking system in which capital is 
rarely available to industry in the long-term on a competitive basis.  The result is an economy emphasising 
finance over manufacturing, and overseas over domestic investment.  It is characterised by pervasive under-
employment, low wages, a massive skills deficit, and a vicious circle of low productivity growth, low 
investment and lack of innovation.   
 
It is easy to see how such a diagnosis of the British affliction might inform proposals for institutional — 
particularly financial — reform.  Yet it is important to note that advocates of systematic attempts to address 
Britain’s distinctive manufacturing investment shortfall have not relied exclusively on such a formulation.  
The so-called Cambridge School have, in particular, drawn upon the work of comparative political 
economists who identify clear clusterings in the institutional arrangements of otherwise distinct ‘national 
capitalisms’ in making their own case for institutional reform.5  Thus, prominent in discussions of industrial 
performance and under-investment in Britain (and perhaps increasingly so) has been the comparison drawn 
between the ‘Anglo-US model’ of capitalism on the one hand, and the ‘German-Japanese’ or ‘Nippo-
Rhenish model’ on the other.6   
 
Despite their obvious similarities, there are important differences between these two approaches.  The 
theorists of British exceptionalism have developed a general analysis of what they take to be the specificity 
of British capitalism.  This allows them, for instance, to trace the arcane and anachronistic character of 
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British democracy (as reflected in an unwritten constitution and an unelected second chamber) to the same 
institutional legacy (that of an incomplete bourgeois revolution) that is also taken to account for Britain’s 
peculiar dislocation of financial and industrial capital.  The same is not true of the comparative political 
economists.  Taking their lead from Gerschenkron’s pioneering analysis, they conceive of finance as “the 
conduit for all economic activity in market economies” and concentrate accordingly upon the 
distinctiveness of financial-industrial relations.7  These they see as underpinning the specificity of distinct 
national capitalisms.  In so doing they identify clear differences between financial systems, and hence clear 
differences in the institutional relationships that pertain between industrial and financial capital in different 
national contexts.  Yet their analysis, unlike that of Anderson and Nairn, emphasises institutional 
similarities and clusterings of national capitalisms which are seen as displaying common characteristics by 
virtue of the type of financial system they exhibit.  Thus the distinctiveness of British capitalism that 
Anderson and Nairn attribute to British exceptionalism, the comparative political economists attribute to 
the specificity of a ‘capital market-based’ financial system that Britain shares with the US.8  What in one 
account is seen as a product of singularity, peculiarity and specificity is, in the other, seen as closely 
approximating one half of the ideal-typical dualism around which the financial systems of the advanced 
capitalist economies can be distributed analytically.   
 
In fact much of the literature on comparative capitalisms is centrally structured around the distinction 
between what, in Gerschenkron’s original analysis, were the different developmental trajectories of British 
and German capitalism respectively,9 and what, in more recent work has resolved itself into the distinction 
between the ‘capital market-based’ systems of the Anglo-US model and the ‘bank-based’ systems of the 
German-Japanese model.10  The latter is characterised by a relatively cheap supply of ‘dedicated’ capital, 
long-term investment and correspondingly high levels of manufacturing growth, a committed and ‘tutelary’ 
(or guardianship) relationship between manufacturers as investors of capital and banks (in the German case, 
Hausbanken) as suppliers of capital, and an active role for the state in the allocation of credit to private 
firms.  In marked contrast, the former exhibits an arms-length relationship between finance and industry 
and a limited role for government.  It is characterised in turn by short-termism, ‘fluid’ as opposed to 
‘dedicated’ capital, high target rates of return, the constant threat of hostile take-overs, a lack of committed 
and long-term investment and correspondingly low levels of manufacturing investment, capacity and 
growth (see Appendix 1).   
 
If, in Albert Hirschmann’s terms, the bank-based financial systems of Germany and Japan are more 
dialogic and are governed by voice (a sotto voce relationship between manufacturers and financiers 
perhaps), then the capital market-based system of the Anglophone model is characterised in contrast by a 
distinct lack of dialogue and communication, by raised voices and ultimately by exit.11 Such a depiction of 
the contours of contemporary capitalism leads its proponents — most of them British or American it should 
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be noted — to conclude with Pollin that “the bank-based systems achieve superior performance in three 
crucial areas: promoting longer time horizons, encouraging financial stability, and providing a framework 
for the successful implementation of government policy”.12   
 
In fact, the diagnosis of the Anglo-US affliction offered by such an analysis is, in many respects, little 
different from that of the British affliction presented by the likes of Anderson and Nairn, and certainly by 
Hutton.  It points to four distinctive pathologies of a capital market-based financial system for 
manufacturing capacity, investment and growth: short-termism; risk-aversion; a propensity to acquisitions, 
mergers and asset-stripping as opposed to rescue strategies where companies fall into difficulties; and a 
series of adverse consequences for the economy’s more general ability to respond to recession.  Though 
closely related it is worth considering each separately and in turn.   
 
Short-termism 
 
Short-termism, widely identified and widely acknowledged as an almost ‘natural’ quality of a capital 
market-based financial system, is generally regarded as having the most adverse consequences for the rest 
of the economy.  The allocation of finance on the basis of prices established in competitive capital markets 
dominated by the desire for liquidity,13 together with the overarching concern of institutional investors 
(such as pension funds) for rapid returns (in line with quarterly assessments of their performance) have 
conspired to lock the financial system into a mindset dominated by immediate concerns at the expense of 
longer-term time horizons.14  This pervasive short-term ethos is exported to industry in two ways.  First, 
those firms either too small or too new to be able to raise finance by other means, become directly 
dependent upon financial institutions and are thus forced to internalise the temporally parochial paradigm 
of their sponsors.  As Simon Lee observes, “UK financial institutions have made capital available to 
industry only at such a prohibitively high cost and for repayment over such a punitively short period of time 
that industrial companies have been confronted with one of the highest costs of capital in the world”.15  Yet 
even those more established and substantial concerns capable of generating funds internally by raising 
equity on the stock market are not immune from the infectious short-termism of the financial institutions.  
For in an active market for corporate control in which hostile take-overs, mergers and acquisitions abound 
(and for which capital is more readily available), corporate managers can simply not afford the luxury of 
long-term considerations and must concentrate instead on the short-term performance criteria necessary to 
stave off predators.16   
 
Risk-aversion 
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If financial institutions within a capital market-based system display a pathological short-termism, they are 
at least equally risk-averse, exhibiting a marked preference for guaranteed returns on investment that are, 
preferably, almost instantaneous.  Again this reflects a desire for liquidity and the remarkably short time 
scale over which investments are expected to pay for themselves.17  Since riskier investments, almost by 
definition, require a more dedicated supply of capital, potentially locking-in otherwise fluid assets, financial 
institutions in a capital market-based system are reluctant to commit capital to such projects.  For as John 
Zysman notes, “long-term loans must be repaid from future profits and therefore, as a minimum, the bank 
must make an assessment [a potentially risky projection] of the company’s competitive future”.  By 
contrast, “short-term loans can simply be secured against existing company assets”.18  Short-termism and 
risk-aversion are thus inextricably interwoven.  Moreover, in a climate dominated by the time horizons of 
the capital markets, risk-aversion is (like short-termism itself) similarly internalised by industry.  If small 
and/or new firms are forced to abandon potentially risky capital investment projects since a supply of 
venture capital is simply unavailable to them on competitive terms (from financial institutions interested 
above all in liquidity and immediate profitability), it might be thought that larger firms would be better 
placed to make more speculative investments.  Sadly this is rarely the case.  For although such firms are 
indeed in a position to raise equity, in a highly developed stock market in which the performance of fund 
managers is judged on a quarterly (even monthly) basis, the raising of equity to fund risky projects is itself 
a risky venture, exposing the company to the close attentions of predators.  In this way, the ‘discipline’ of 
the capital markets imposes itself on the entire domestic economy, radically condensing time horizons and 
militating severely against risk-taking.   
 
Acquisitions, mergers and asset-stripping 
 
In bank-based financial systems in which the industrial-financial relation is characterised by dedication, 
reciprocity, mutuality and commitment on both sides, banks tend to respond to management problems 
within firms by launching often highly intrusive and interventionist rescue strategies.19  In capital market-
based systems, by contrast, corporate difficulties tend instead to precipitate a wholly different set of 
processes as the vultures gather overhead.  Here the lack of dedication of financial institutions and the 
absence of what Stephen Woolcock terms ‘relationship banking’ becomes cruelly apparent — to the 
considerable detriment of the company experiencing difficulties. 
 
In such situations, pressure mounts on institutional investors (such as pension funds who may often have a 
majority stake in the company concerned) to sell their shareholding to predator holding companies.  Indeed, 
where a potential bidder seeks control of the company, the share price will tend to rise (by the so-called 
‘bidding premium’).  This reflects anticipated future profit arising either from projected efficiency gains or, 
more likely, asset-stripping.  Should the take-over bid prove unsuccessful, it is extremely unlikely that the 
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share price will remain at its inflated level.  This then provides a powerful, and in most cases a sufficient, 
incentive for institutional investors to accept take-over offers (if not actively to court them) that can only 
boost their quarterly performance.20 
 
Yet were this enticement not in itself sufficient, three further factors exacerbate the tendency of institutional 
investors to abandon their stake in companies experiencing difficulties to the vultures of the market in 
corporate control — to “the so-called triple alliance of corporate raiders, junk bond dealers (merchant banks 
selling-off high yielding bonds created to finance take-overs) and arbitrageurs (people taking positions in 
companies they predict will be targets for corporate raiders)”.21  First, bankruptcy laws in Britain, as in the 
US, severely penalise relationship banking.  For direct intervention on the part of a bank in the affairs of an 
ailing company is likely to result in the bank losing seniority in any subsequent debt claims.  This, as 
Woolcock notes, provides “a fairly powerful disincentive to active intervention”.22  Second, strict insider 
trading legislation in Britain and the US also militates against an active role for institutional share-holders.  
Thus intervention in the affairs of a customer in difficulty is simply not an option for institutional investors 
(who may, in all likelihood, lack expertise in corporate affairs) if they are to remain within the law.23  
Finally, deregulation has led to intense competition amongst bank and other financial institutions in Britain 
in recent years.  As Woolcock again observes, “this has tended to undermine any relationship banking that 
existed.  Faced with strong competition, banks have tried to ‘poach’ new customers, and companies have 
found an advantage in maintaining links with competing institutions in order to get the best conditions.  As 
a result close relationships, based on trust, between companies and banks have become harder rather than 
easier to maintain”.24  In such a context, rescue strategies are rarely contemplated, confirming a tendency in 
capital market-based financial systems for acquisitions, mergers and asset-stripping as a response to 
corporate failure.   
 
Responses to recession 
 
In capital market-based systems, the expectation on manufacturers during a recession is for a large scale 
shedding of under-utilised capacity and a laying-off of workers — an expectation which companies may 
choose to disappoint but only at a likely cost to their share price.  Thus as John Grieve Smith notes of the 
UK, “the roles of the suppliers of risk capital and the members of the company (its work-force) have 
become reversed.  If profits are hit, dividends are maintained and employees sacked ... employees bear a 
much greater risk than the suppliers of capital”.25  In bank-based financial systems such as Germany and 
Japan, by contrast, dedicated investors will seek to preserve jobs and capacity at a short-term cost to 
themselves of dividends on their investment.   
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The consequences for the relative ability of capital market-based economies to respond to recession are 
severe.  They are characteristically slower to recover, since their beleaguered capital stock places them in a 
poor position to respond to any upturn in demand.  Moreover, the loss of sector-specific skills and specialist 
capital equipment may be difficult to replace, due both to the existence of significant sunk costs and the 
lack of a dedicated supply of venture capital.26  Given this shortfall of manufacturing capacity, a recovery 
in the domestic economy is likely to result in a significant influx of imports from bank-based economies 
less hasty to shed capacity during recession and hence better placed to respond to rising demand in the post-
recession period.  The result, almost inevitably, is a growing trade imbalance and pressure on the currency.  
Historically, British governments anxious to preserve sterling’s role as a reserve currency have responded 
to such a set of circumstances through deflationary strategies (rather than devaluation), further 
compounding the problems for manufacturers by weakening international competitiveness and hence 
sacrificing profits and future investment.27  Accordingly, the largely self-fulfilling expectation on the part 
of capital markets that, in recession, manufacturers will shed workforce and industrial capacity has 
profoundly adverse consequences for both the ability of the economy to cope with recession and the level 
of employment over the entire economic cycle.   
 
 
Putting the ‘political’ back into comparative political economy 
 
As the above analysis would perhaps suggest, both the extensive literature on comparative capitalisms and 
the exceptionalism thesis serve to highlight in clear and unambiguous fashion a series of common 
institutional and/or more broadly structural weaknesses of the British economy.  Whether these are 
attributed to the incomplete character of Britain’s bourgeois revolution and the developmental pathologies 
of a precocious capitalism, or to a capital market-based financial system that it shares with the US, a stark 
and remarkably consistent diagnosis of the British affliction is presented.  Both accounts provide an 
important indication of the challenge that confronts New Labour in power if it is to remain true to its 
manifesto commitment to restore an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism28 and, arguably, to 
succeed where the more professedly reformist Attlee and Wilson administrations failed.29   
 
In the sections that follow we turn our attentions to macroeconomic, industrial and institutional priorities 
suggestive of a modernising alternative to the pervasive neo-liberal orthodoxy of the times.  
 
 
New Labour, new monetary policy? 
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The central focus of our paper is the need to restore an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism as 
a means of inserting sustainable long-term growth dynamics into the domestic economy.30  We seek to 
explore, in what at this stage is still a speculative manner, one way in which it may be possible to alleviate 
some of the supply constraints which currently impede the flow of capital funds into productive projects.  
What is required, we suggest, is a re-definition of the very context within which institutional investors 
operate in Britain, altering in particular the incentives faced by fund managers.  By re-casting these 
incentives in an appropriate manner, we hope that such investors can be persuaded to direct significantly 
more of their assets into long-term debt in British companies; and that, in turn, these companies will use 
these new capital funds for long-term productive investments. 
 
If Labour in government is to initiate an investment-led reflation of the British economy, then it is, we 
argue, to new and previously untried policy approaches that it must turn.  For it seems clear that classical 
instruments of reflationary policy are no longer ‘sharp’ enough to drive such a policy on their own.  
Historically, investment potentials were enhanced through monetary expansions.  Increases in the domestic 
money supply would force down the domestic rate of interest, which would in turn decrease the cost of 
borrowing to fund new capital projects.  Moreover, the effect of any increase in the money supply would 
filter through into the currency markets.  An anticipated fall in the rate of interest would depress the value 
of the domestic currency, thereby providing a further boost to investment.  As the pound would fall, so 
British goods would become more competitive internationally, facilitating expansion into new export 
markets.  In this way, monetary growth creates a clear incentive for British manufacturers to expand and 
enhance their productive capacity. 
 
Within this framework, the analyst is drawn towards a simple conclusion — the trend rate of investment in 
the British economy is insufficient to sustain adequate rates of growth; and a clear policy implication — cut 
interest rates to stimulate further investment.  Yet in the current context, such a conclusion would be overly 
simplistic.  For the link between the rate of interest and the rate of productive investment appears to have 
been weakened in recent times, ‘blunting’ the efficacy of monetary policy.  Domestic interest rates have 
become ever more sensitive to activity within international financial and currency markets.31  As the 
turnover of these markets has increased exponentially since the world-wide relaxation of capital controls in 
the 1980s,32 so the latitude of national governments to set their own monetary policies has been 
progressively eroded.  Furthermore, at the same time as an increase in the mobility of financial capital has 
ensured that governments can only make very marginal adjustments to their monetary stance, the 
emergence of new financial instruments being traded on the money markets has meant that a far greater 
change in interest rates is required to secure a desired change in the level of investment demand.   
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Quite clearly then, more than mere temporary policy change is required if an indigenous investment ethic is 
to be restored to British capitalism.  Potential capital investors appear to have formed the expectation that, 
irrespective of the monetary policy observed in the short-run, longer-term tendencies will consistently act 
to militate against dedicated productive investments.33  It is above all necessary, therefore, to change 
investors’ expectations about the future, and this only appears likely in the context of a prior and quite 
fundamental change in the whole mind-set informing economic policy-making in Britain.  This appears all 
the more pressing now that Gordon Brown has ceded operational responsibility for interest rate policy to 
the Bank of England.  For, as the Financial Times’ editorial argued the day after his momentous decision, 
“[the Bank] is still viewed as the spokesman [sic]  for the City”; an impression that subsequent 
developments would only seem to reinforce.34  The fear persists that the combination of the Bank’s new 
role and its old image has, and will continue to be taken by productive interests as a sign that they should 
expect no lasting change in the cost of borrowing.  In short, the de-politicisation of interest rate policy has 
served further to institutionalise in policy terms the primacy of financial over industrial interests.  It is 
precisely such an expectation which already undermines productive investment. 
 
The economic ‘stability’ which Gordon Brown espouses, therefore, and with which he justified his decision 
to grant operational independence to the Bank,35 can only be interpreted as stability on financial capital’s 
terms.  For the tight monetary stance which the Bank of England has already indicated will be necessary to 
ensure ‘financial stability’ can only further destabilise indigenous investment potential.  It is then still 
possible, and we would suggest vital (however unfashionable), to justify calls for a looser monetary stance.  
Yet given that a combination of enhanced financial mobility and innovatory new practices within the 
financial markets appears to have ‘blunted’ the efficacy of domestic interest rate policy, this may not of 
itself be sufficient to close Britain’s investment gap.  Nonetheless, a relaxation in the monetary stance may 
go some way towards re-casting the Bank’s current reputation for acting as a spokesperson (and now also 
policy-maker) for the City.  This in turn may help to change the expectations of potential investors about 
the future economic context — expectations on which their willingness to invest depends. 
 
Our concern is with the effect of the dominant monetary policy paradigm in Britain on indigenous 
productive investment potentials.  The general reluctance of British managers to expand productive 
capacity is in large part a result of perceptions of increased risk within the real economy.  The case for an 
active state to intervene in an attempt to reduce such perceptions must once again be made.  Yet as Ciaran 
Driver argues, currently heightened risk perceptions “have less to do with inflationary expectations than 
with the prospects for sustainable demand growth”.36  This in turn suggests that present government 
interventions in the economy designed, in Gordon Brown’s words, “to achieve our objectives for inflation” 
by making them “the number one priority for policy”, are somewhat misdirected.37  Indeed, the deflationary 
monetary stance of the government (reflected in its target inflation rate of 2.5 per cent or below) is perhaps 
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in itself the biggest single impediment to a sustainable growth in demand.  Expectations of ineffective 
demand feed through into higher expected risk levels for any given rate of productive investment, which in 
turn act as a disincentive to investment in new capacity.  This is the now familiar story of Britain’s recent 
macroeconomic history — of an ever more vicious circle of under-investment—constrained growth—
ineffective demand—under-investment and so forth.38  Moreover, the new Labour government’s 
pronouncements on economic policy suggest that this peculiarly British cycle of under-investment may 
well be reproduced in the future.  In such a context we put the case for a pro-active government to attempt 
to construct a distinctively British solution to the problem of British under-investment.  In the following 
pages we offer a series of suggestions for institutional reform.  The hope is not only to increase the quantity 
but equally the quality of new productive investments. 
 
 
In the dedicated pursuit of inward investment: the cost to indigenous investors 
 
There is a tendency to assume that the question of the ‘quality’ of investment is concerned principally, if 
not exclusively, with the ‘dedication’ of indigenous investors.  This we reject.  The issue of quality is an 
issue of equal importance when assessing the relative merits and demerits of inward investment and of 
strategies to promote it.  Moreover, precisely the same criterion of ‘dedication’ can be deployed in 
evaluating the quality of foreign direct investment.  At first glance, the image conjured (and now almost 
synonymous with) the popular narrative of globalistion — that of spatially footloose multi-national 
corporations operating within a boundary-free international political economy — appears inimical to the 
notion of capital dedication.  Indeed, given that strategies of inward investment are in fact conditional upon 
such heightened mobility, it is certainly tempting to conclude that inward investment is the very antithesis 
of dedication.   
 
Yet there are dangerous assumptions submerged within such a conclusion.  Though capital mobility there 
surely is, much of the story of capital’s footloose properties is at best a crude exaggeration, at worst a 
distorting myth.39  Even the giants of the multinational world apparently still need to put down roots in their 
host localities.  Furthermore, through the sunk costs they incur during the initial process of re-location, 
multinationals exhibiting this mobility often tie themselves to their host localities.  In so doing they may 
effectively cut off many of their own subsequent exit options.  Yet as we have elsewhere suggested, the 
myth of ‘hyper-mobility’ may well be a necessary and certainly a strategic myth for firms to maintain if 
they wish to maximise their hold over governments.40  Capital tends to talk up the possibility of 
disinvestment through mobility in order to secure a capital-friendly economic climate with as few 
regulatory restrictions as possible on its activities.41  In circumstances in which the threat of capital flight is 
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perceived to be a real one, inward investors may well be rewarded (with extra economic subsidies and 
political favours) merely for staying put. 
 
These subsidies in themselves have the potential to increase the ‘dedication’ of inward investors through 
increasing their long-term place-boundedness.42  The British government, perhaps more so than any other, 
has attempted to exploit the possibilities of such subsidisation strategies.43  The concomitant expectation is 
that the future gains which may accrue from subsidising the re-location of inward investors will prove to 
outweigh the initial subsidisation costs.  In most cases, too, inward investors seem more than willing to 
acquiesce with government in strategies aimed at removing potential exit options in return for initial (and 
often continuing) subsidies.  It would indeed seem as though the dedication of many if not all inward 
investors can be ‘bought’ — the price being the perceived cost of dedication itself.    
 
Yet despite the substantial sums devoted to promoting the dedication of inward investors, there is little 
evidence to suggest a significant increase in the ‘quality’ of inward investment in Britain.  The wage rates 
being offered by inward investors act as a suitable proxy for the degree to which these re-locating capitals 
are operating in the high-tech, high-skill, high-wage, high-value added sectors indicative of high quality 
investments.  Consider the Welsh experience.  The available evidence shows precious little concentration of 
inward investment in the high-wage, high-value added sectors.  Yet the figures for Wales should, if 
anything, exaggerate the significance of inward investment to the British economy.  For inward investment 
is more important in the Welsh context in terms both of political rhetoric and economic activity, than it is 
for any other comparable British region.  Moreover, both household disposable income and net pay rates 
are lower per capita than in any other British region.44  However, despite this, we still find that the average 
wage rates paid by inward investors in Wales are well below the Welsh average.45 
 
Such doubts about the ‘quality’ of the foreign direct investment that successive British governments have 
worked so assiduously to attract have clear implications for public policy in this area.  In the light of the 
above discussion it is important to consider again (and we would suggest, to review critically) the extent to 
which government economic policies have been, and continue to be, justified by their ability to attract 
inward investment.  For, not only do these inward investments often appear to be of dubious ‘quality’; also, 
and more importantly, the policies designed to attract such investors simultaneously undermine the 
promotion of ‘dedicated’ indigenous investment.  As we have been at pains to demonstrate, much of 
Britain’s indigenous investment ethic has been sacrificed on the altar of an overly restrictive monetary 
policy.  Paradoxically, however, it is now these very same dear-money policies which government officials 
insist must be maintained to provide the ‘financial stability’ that inward investors like to present as a 
condition of their re-location.46   
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In marked contrast, we wish to see a new context for British economic policy-making within which inward 
investment does not continue to exert such an overbearing influence.  We make no attempt to disguise the 
distinct normative agenda underpinning this argument.  For, wherever inward investment does seem to hold 
such an influence over policy decisions — and, more importantly, wherever government perceptions are 
that it should, and should continue to do so — the evidence of recent experience would suggest that the 
politics of labour market deregulation, competitive undercutting and welfare retrenchment will surely 
follow.  If we are to avoid such current ‘inevitabilities’ then it is to indigenous investment and institutional 
innovation that we must turn.   
 
 
Instilling an indigenous investment ethic amongst institutional investors 
 
‘..necessity is the mother of invention’  
 
UK based investors constitute the largest purchasers of portfolio assets in the world.  If Labour is to re-
instil within the British economy an indigenous investment ethic, it is above all imperative that it considers 
systematic reform to the institutional, legal and indeed more broadly perceptual environment in which 
portfolio investors (such as pension funds and insurance companies) operate.  Consider pension funds.  
These ‘gross funds’, exempt from both income and capital gains tax, represent the largest institutional 
investors in Britain, contributing significantly to the speculative and short-term bias of the capital markets.  
Recent figures indicate that UK pension funds accounted for some 70 per cent of Gross National Product in 
1993, holding some 52 per cent of shares in quoted companies.47  Moreover, as David Blake notes, if we 
include insurance companies as well, then “institutional investors’ ownership of UK companies’ equity has 
increased from less than 30 per cent in the early 1960s to more than 60 per cent in the early 1990s.  It has 
been estimated that about fifty top fund managers have effective control (51 per cent) of UK industry”.48  
 
It might be thought that given the long-term nature of pension fund activity and the relatively stable and 
predictable character of both their inflows (in the form of employers’ and employees’ contributions) and 
their outflows (in the form of actual pension payments), pension funds might be exemplary dedicated long-
term investors in domestic manufacturing industry.  Sadly nothing could be further from the truth.  As 
Randy Barber and Teresa Ghilarducci observe in an exemplary discussion of the pathologies of portfolio 
investment in the US that is equally applicable to the UK, “these massive pools of capital are uniquely 
suited to fund long-term investments because their liabilities are stable, predictable and extended over 
many decades.  However, over the past two decades, pension funds often invested very differently in 
capital markets as their mostly futile pursuit of above-average returns contributed heavily to ‘short-
termism’ and speculation in the economy as a whole”.  As they go on to note, “arguably, their behaviour 
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was one of the main detriments to prospects for long-term economic growth, employment creation, and 
increases in real income”.49  Despite predictable and long-term liabilities then, pension funds on both sides 
of the Atlantic display a marked preference for highly liquid assets that they often retain for less than two 
years.   
 
As well as this pathological aversion to dedicated investment, institutional investors in recent years have 
channelled vast and growing quantities of capital overseas.  This tendency has accelerated significantly 
since financial deregulation, in particular the abolition of exchange controls on overseas investment on 24 
October 1979 (see Tables 1 and 2). 
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Table 1: Asset Allocation of UK Pension Funds in 1979 and 1989 
 
 
Asset allocation 
1979 (%) 
Asset allocation 
1989 (%) 
UK equity 44 52 
Overseas equity 6 14 
UK bonds 23 13 
Overseas bonds 0 1 
Index linked bonds 0 3 
UK property 22 10 
Overseas property 0 1 
Other 6 8 
 
Source: David Blake, Issues in Pension Funding (Routledge, 1992), p. 20 
 
The above analysis presents a significant, unanswered and, we would suggest, unanswerable case for 
institutional reform.   
 
Table 2: Overseas Holding of UK Pension Funds 1993 
 
 
Share of total 
investment held in 
overseas assets (1993) 
Canada 9 
France 5 
Germany 3 
Japan 14 
UK 27 
US 4 
 
 
Although a variety of proposals and reform strategies to maximise the potential benefits of pension funds’ 
investments to the productive economy might be considered we here present merely a basic outline of one 
such reform strategy.   
 
In the context of such reflections, our aim is not to produce a series of detailed policy proposals designed to 
address the persistent shortfall of dedicated productive investment in the domestic economy.50  Rather, in 
what follows, we hope to suggest how an alternative conception of the parameters of the politically and 
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economically possible liberated from the shackles of a restrictive neo-liberal economic imaginary might 
inform a more developmental and modernising strategy for the domestic economy.  Though such an 
alternative paradigm might equally inform policy at spatial scales above the national, we restrict ourselves 
here to domestic considerations.  In so doing, our intention is to demonstrate that heightened capital 
mobility in an era of financial liberalisation need not entail a withering of the political autonomy of the 
nation(al)-state.   
 
Having identified and catalogued the haemorrhaging of potentially productive institutional assets out of the 
domestic economy (see Table 2) and the parochialism and short-termism of portfolio investors, it is perhaps 
appropriate that we begin by considering the prospects for the reform of the investment environment within 
which institutional investors operate.  Set in this context it is certainly tempting to consider removing the 
status of portfolio investors as gross funds and hence their capital gain and income tax exemption.51  
Enticing though such a measure might at first appear, however, we fear this would only serve to precipitate 
an exodus of pension funds from the British capital market and/or a lowering of dividends (likely to be 
passed directly onto pensioners).  More promising, we suggest, is conditional capital gains tax exemption.  
In order to remain eligible, funds would have to demonstrate a balanced investment portfolio in which a 
certain percentage of total investments were held long-term (say, over five years).  In an indication of the 
manner in which the investment environment might gradually be re-shaped, this proportion could slowly be 
revised upwards to a target level, allowing flexible and incremental yet cumulatively significant change.  
Continued capital gains tax exemption could also be made conditional upon the investment of a certain 
proportion of fund holdings in UK assets (equity, bonds or property).  Administratively simpler, though 
somewhat less flexible, would be to introduce capital gains tax on short-term gains (and, potentially, on 
returns on overseas investments), to be compensated for by credits on tax-deductible long-term gains.  
Credits could also be accumulated for socially-responsible investments (SRIs), economically-targeted 
investments (ETIs) and special issues of regional bonds designed to promote productive investment in the 
local and regional economy52   
 
In addition to such changes to the architecture of investment, we propose a simple reform to the 1961 
Trustee Investments Act governing institutional investors.  In a legal redefinition of the notion of the ‘best 
interests’ of pension fund beneficiaries, trustees would be required to provide a statement of the criteria by 
which investment decisions were made and would be expected to be answerable to those criteria in 
justifying particular investment choices.53  The amendment of the existing legislation would also mandate 
the representation of beneficiaries on the board of trustees, a measure that would have considerably more 
force were it linked in this way to a revision of the concept of ‘best interests’.54 
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Those ideas that Labour developed in opposition that sought to redress the persistent shortfall of dedicated 
investment in the productive economy and the need for industrial modernisation have focused in particular 
on the need for differentiated, but nonetheless complementary, regional industrial development and 
investment strategies.55  Consistent supply-side intervention might here make a virtue of spatially uneven 
development by promoting managed yet differentiated regional development.  In keeping with such a 
reform agenda that emphasises the need for industrial strategy, supply-side dirigisme, indigenous and 
differentiated regional growth profiles, and the subordination of the interests of finance to industrial capital, 
we propose a a series of specifically regional institutional reforms designed to promote investment in the 
regional economy.  Perhaps the simplest and arguably the crudest means to increase investment in the 
regional economy would be the introduction of regional pension funds.  Capitalised initially with public 
funds, they would, thereafter, be expected to produce profits from their investment activities without further 
reliance on public resources.  In the first instance, they would receive significant tax concessions from the 
centre, conditional upon an investment of a significant proportion of their assets in regionally-based 
institutions and projects and on a medium- to long-term basis.  The logistical difficulties of introducing 
such a scheme may, however, prove insurmountable.56  Accordingly, a strategy for enticing existing 
(private) pension funds into a greater regionalisation of their investment activities may ultimately prove 
more fruitful.  Such a strategy would be based again on tax credits.  In addition to credits on long-term 
investment, the regional development agencies (RDAs) proposed in Labour’s election manifesto would be 
encouraged to package regional investment portfolios in the form of regional bonds to be traded to 
institutional investors such as pension funds.  RDAs would here act as investment brokers, intermediating 
between the regional industry on the one hand and institutional investors on the other.  Inclusion of a 
company’s stock within such regional investment bonds might be made conditional upon a democratisation 
of corporate governance (and hence the principles of ‘regional stakeholding’).   
 
The above proposals in turn suggest the need for a nexus of regional institutions dedicated to the supply of 
investment capital on competitive terms to regional industry.  It should the goal of the government to 
ensure that each regional economy have access to a financial sector dedicated to the provision of capital 
over the long-term.  Institutional reform at the regional level would thus see the creation of a series of non-
profitmaking investment and commercial banks which might channel savings and institutional investments 
to the productive economy.  Such dedicated regional financial institutions would be able to provide capital 
on a long-term and competitive basis to fund regional industrial investment and capital projects that were 
seen as contributing to the overall competitiveness of the regional economy.   
 
 
Conclusion 
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These reflections constitute a modest attempt to outline some of the measures that an incumbent Labour 
administration might consider in seeking to restore an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism.  It 
must be reiterated that it has not been, nor is it, our intention to offer detailed policy outlines in the form of 
an ‘alternative industrial policy manifesto’ for Labour in power.  Our proposals are speculative and 
experimental and should be judged accordingly.  Our concern has been to stimulate and open up discussion 
of the nature of the British affliction and the extent of the measures required to address it in the light of the 
contribution of comparative political economists and contemporary theorists of British exceptionalism.   
 
Labour’s 1997 manifesto contains a commitment to combat Britain’s significant and enduring problem of 
under-investment.  It is a moot point whether that commitment represents a merely rhetorical reaffirmation 
of a pledge that it no longer intends to prioritise, or a restatement of an underlying and consistent diagnosis 
of the principal structural weakness of the British economy which the party in government is dedicated to 
addressing.  The jury, to give New Labour the benefit of the doubt, is still out.  Either way, we suggest, 
some attempt must be made to restore to British capitalism an ethos of dedication and long-term investment 
and hence to close the capital stock gap with the other major industrialised economies.  Otherwise, to echo 
Michael Kitson and Jonathan Michie, “the alternative is to accept that ... [Britain] cannot compete with 
these countries and that its comparable competitors are the newly industrialised countries, with all that this 
entails for domestic living standards and employment opportunities”.57  Yet, as we have been at pains to 
demonstrate, to restore such an investment ethic to British capitalism is no easy accomplishment and cannot 
be achieved in the space of a few years.  It requires significant and cumulatively radical institutional reform 
and a yet more fundamental transformation of the very conceptual and ideational environment within which 
economic policy and investment decisions are made.  These we suggest are necessary, but not in 
themselves, sufficient conditions to establish in Britain a reinvigorated growth dynamic.   
 
If any aspect of the above diagnosis is correct, then for New Labour and a re-newed and revitalised left, it is 
time to find out whether necessity is indeed ‘the mother of invention’.  If it is not, then sadly New Labour’s 
modernisation may have come at the ultimate price of Britain’s modernisation.  For the time being, 
however, we remain optimistic.   
 
 
 
                                                          
* The authors would like to thank Mark Blyth, Andrew Gamble, Michael Kenny, Mark Wickham-Jones, 
Daniel Wincott and the referees for New Political Economy for their perceptive and encouraging comments 
on an earlier version of this paper.  Much though it would be nice to blame the usual suspects for all our 
errors and omissions, they must, as ever, remain protected by the usual veil of disclaimers.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Although the relationships between savings and investment, and investment and growth cannot be reduced 
to simple linear models of cause and effect, Angus Maddison’s growth accounting statistics do nonetheless 
point to some clear associations.  Both associations are positive, with high savings/GDP ratios correlated 
with high investment/GDP ratios, and high rates of investment correlated with high rates of growth.  
[Source: Angus Maddison, Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations:  Essays in Time and Space 
(Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 171-80] 
 
 
Table A.1.1: Total gross savings as a ratio of GDP at current market prices 
 
 1960-73 (% ) 1974-80 (% ) 1981-87 (% ) 
U.K. 19.5 20.9 17.5 
Canada 23.4 22.7 20.4 
France 26.8 24.9 20.0 
Germany 28.6 24.1 24.0 
Japan 36.1 33.0 32.8 
Korea 10.1 24.3 31.0 
U.S.A. 19.7 19.7 16.7 
 
 
Table A.1.2: Gross fixed domestic investment as a ratio of GDP at current market prices 
 
 1960-73 (% ) 1974-80 (% ) 1981-87 (% ) 
U.K. 17.9 18.8 16.5 
Canada 22.4 23.6 21.2 
France 23.8 23.5 20.2 
Germany 24.9 21.1 20.2 
Japan 32.6 31.7 29.2 
Korea 18.9 29.4 28.6 
U.S.A. 17.8 18.4 17.7 
 
 
Table A.1.3: Rate of growth of GDP per capita (annual average compound growth rate) 
 
 1950-73 (% ) 1973-89 (% ) 
U.K. 2.5 1.8 
Canada 2.9 2.5 
France 4.1 1.8 
Germany 4.9 2.0 
Japan 8.0 3.1 
Korea 5.2 6.4 
U.S.A. 2.2 1.6 
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Table A.1.4: Standardised levels of savings, investment and growth 
 
 Rank on Maddison’s scale 
re: standardised level of 
savings 1960-1987 
Rank on Maddison’s scale 
re: standardised level of 
fixed investment 1960-
1987 
Rank on Maddison’s scale 
re: standardised annual 
r ate of growth 1950-1989 
U.K. 6 7 6 
Canada 5 5 5 
France 4 4 4 
Germany 2 3 3 
Japan 1 1 1 
Korea 3 2 2 
U.S.A. 7 6 7 
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Appendix 2 
 
A central claim of this paper is that Britain needs a new monetary policy paradigm in order to stimulate 
new investment activity.  This claim is based on the assumption that the British economy operates to a 
tighter monetary policy than the economies of the ‘national capitalisms’ which consistently out-perform 
Britain in terms of growth rates.  The following figures offer evidence to support these claims.  Table A.2.1 
shows the observed levels of British interest rates (both short and long) in comparative perspective with 
those of the United States, Japan and Germany for the years 1987-1996.  The table reveals that Britain’s 
monetary stance has indeed been tighter in these years than it has been elsewhere (as shown by the higher 
rates of interest prevailing throughout this period).  Table A.2.2 moves on to cast light on the size of the 
interest rate premium that potential British investors have to pay in relation to their counterparts in the 
United States, Japan and Germany. 
 
 
Table A.2.1: Interest rates in comparative perspective: Britain tight monetary stance 
 
 U.S.A. Japan Germany U.K. 
 Short 
Interest 
Rate 
Long 
Interest 
Rate 
Short 
Interest 
Rate 
Long 
Interest 
Rate 
Short 
Interest 
Rate 
Long 
Interest 
Rate 
Short 
Interest 
Rate 
Long 
Interest 
Rate 
1987 6.82 8.39 4.15 4.64 4.03 6.14   9.77   9.69 
1988 7.65 8.84 4.43 4.77 4.34 6.46 10.41   9.62 
1989 8.99 8.50 5.31 5.16 7.12 6.90 13.96 10.11 
1990 8.06 8.55 7.62 6.90 8.49 8.66 14.82 11.56 
1991 5.87 7.86 7.21 6.40 9.25 8.42 11.58 10.08 
1992 3.75 7.00 4.28 5.24 9.52 7.80   9.74   9.09 
1993 3.22 5.86 2.83 4.18 7.28 6.47   5.99   7.40 
1994 4.67 7.08 2.12 4.20 5.36 6.86   5.57   8.01 
1995 5.93 6.57 1.12 3.39 4.53 6.82   6.77   8.16 
1996 5.41 6.43 0.48 3.03 3.31 6.21   6.11   7.79 
 
Source: Financial Times, 8 April 1997, p. 6; Datastream. 
 
Short-term interest rates: period averages of U.S.A. — 90 day commercial paper; Japan — 3 month 
certificates of deposit; Germany — 3 month Fibor; U.K. — 3 month Libor. 
Long-term interest rates: period average yields on 10-year benchmark government bonds. 
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Table A.2.2: Interest rate premiums on investment 
 
 Shor t  
Interest Rates 
U.K. Shor t 
Interest Rate 
Premium, over : 
Long  
Interest Rates 
U.K. Long 
Interest Rate 
Premium, over : 
 U.K. Average Best Average Best U.K. Average Best Average Best 
1987 9.77 5.00 4.03 4.77 5.74 9.69 6.39 4.64 3.30 5.05 
1988 10.41 5.47 4.34 4.94 6.07 9.62 6.69 4.77 2.93 4.85 
1989 13.96 7.14 5.31 6.82 8.55 10.11 6.85 5.16 3.26 4.95 
1990 14.82 8.06 7.62 6.76 7.20 11.56 8.04 6.90 3.52 4.66 
1991 11.58 7.44 5.87 4.14 5.71 10.08 7.56 6.40 2.52 3.68 
1992 9.74 5.85 3.75 3.89 5.99 9.09 6.68 5.24 2.41 3.85 
1993 5.99 4.44 2.83 1.55 3.16 7.40 5.50 4.18 1.90 3.22 
1994 5.57 4.05 2.12 1.52 3.45 8.01 6.43 4.20 1.58 3.81 
1995 6.77 3.86 1.12 2.91 5.65 8.16 5.59 3.39 2.57 4.77 
1996 6.11 3.07 0.48 3.04 5.63 7.79 5.22 3.03 2.57 4.76 
 
Note: ‘Average’ interest rate denotes the standardised mean for U.S., Japanese and German interest rates.  
‘Best’ interest rate denotes the lowest observed rate in the three economies.  (‘Short’ and ‘long’ interest 
rates are defined as above.) 
  
